What is Philosophy?

Anil Mitra © November 1, 2021 - August 10, 2023

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Contents

Introduction

What is philosophy?

Introduction

Ways to answer the question

Approaches in philosophy

Branches of philosophy

Metaphysics

What is metaphysics?

Problems of metaphysics

Some metaphysical questions—a sample

Epistemology

What is epistemology?

Some questions of epistemology

Axiology

What is axiology?

What is ethics?

What is aesthetics

Logic

What is logic?

Some questions about logic

History of philosophy

Philosophers in chronological order

Western schools and ideologies

Indian philosophy—periods and schools

Ideas

Philosophies of the disciplines

Our world—philosophy of the humanities

The real and given universe

Artifact and the created world

Being and the universe

Holism

Philosophy

On systematic philosophy

Emergence of system

A note on purism*

A note on holism*

Language, meaning, and philosophy*

Metaphilosophy

Experimental philosophy

Non-western philosophy

Philosophy and science

The meaning of life

About the meaning of life

Philosophy in action

What is philosophy, revisited?

Appendix I—The problems of philosophy

General

Appendix II—Sources

On Philosophy

Introduction

It is impossible to fully understand what a discipline is from a brief description. Therefore, the main essay begins and ends with the question ‘What is philosophy?’. The intent is that by the final reading, a better understanding will occur. Yet, the essay itself will show that reading (it) will not fully inform us as to the nature of philosophy. The best knowledge of what philosophy is will come from doing, reading, and reflecting on philosophy, and even that will not—cannot—be fully adequate. That is because philosophy, which seeks the greatest breadth and depth of understanding, is and must be evolving.

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To whom does philosophy appeal?

There are some people who find philosophy intrinsically meaningful and exciting. Some of them spend a lifetime of involvement with philosophy, some become academic philosophers

To whom else will philosophy appeal?

If there is a ‘discipline’ that asks, attempts to answer and to discover how to answer the deepest and broadest of questions, that discipline would be philosophy. Such questions would range over ‘What is there in the world, and how can this be known?’, ‘What is our relation to the world?’, ‘What can we expect and how ought we to live?’. These questions are of course related. You may recognize their similarities to Immanuel Kant’s famous three questions.

Even though academic philosophy is often specialized, philosophy itself has appeal to those persons, academic and other, interested in the big questions.

This essay is intended as a brief introduction to and outline of philosophy. Philosophy will appeal to those who find any of the topics of interest.

Particularly, philosophy will appeal to people who—

Want to learn about the world as known in science and beyond science.

Would improve their ability to reason and develop arguments in support of theses.

Want to learn about reason itself.

Have a point of view, belief, faith, or tentative knowledge that they want to found (justify) or critique. Such issues include materialism, idealism, and pragmatism; empiricism and rationalism; religion or a particular faith; the secular attitude that the world of common experience is all that is real and significant.

Wish to see one-ness immanent in the diversity of things. The diversity is of course manifest; the one-ness can be seen, for example, in that the three Kant style questions above are aspects of a full description of the world.

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I wrote this document out of (i) an interest in philosophy, its nature, and branches and their interactions (ii) an interest in how philosophy interacts with other disciplines (iii) an intent to make an outline structure for a database of philosophy articles on the Internet for personal and perhaps for public use.

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The original source for the structure of the article was the Florida State University philosophy webpage, what is philosophy? Though I have changed and added much, the signature of that webpage remains. The essay derives from years of reading. Explicit external reading while writing the essay was limited and is linked in the essay.

Much of what I say, is derived from my thinking recorded in my site, the way of being. However, the little explicit material from the site is in support of my view of metaphysics and the potential of philosophy. Regarding that potential, (i) I see it as greater than is common today for philosophy and as my work reveals the human prospect (ii) my interest intersects but is significantly different from the interests of the modern emphases of analytic or continental philosophy. But I have, I hope, not prejudiced the essay, which I have kept neutral by embedding my thought in the general context.

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On neutrality and commitment—in my early and middle phases of reading, thought, and writing in philosophy, I favored neutrality over commitment to positions as a way to learn about philosophical questions and answers; later I found myself justifying some commitments; but it seems to me that both neutrality and commitment are useful in presentations; and rather than ‘balance’ neutrality and commitment, I have often stated both committed and neutral positions—and sometimes suggestions of ways to go beyond neutrality vs commitment.

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Sections or paragraphs marked with a star have some theoretical content that is not commonly accepted.*

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Planned enhancements of the essay include replacing or supplementing the bulleted examples in various sections by systematic outlines of the topics; this will be done using philosophy.html and its links; there are also other modifications that philosophy.html suggests. Such outlines, suggested by standard treatments, may also be derived from the nature or meaning of the topics.

What is philosophy?

Introduction

‘Philosophy’, from the Greek philosophia, means “love of wisdom”. Western philosophy began 2,700 years ago, in Greece, with a turn away from superstition.

Understanding would be gained by reason, not dogma, and in terms of the world itself—of nature rather than myth. Broadly, the central issues of philosophy are naturally with the world, our human being, and their relationships.

From concerns with truth and completeness, academic philosophy become formal and systematic, and this was expressed in the emergence of disciplines or branches of philosophy.

Empirically, western philosophy, which originally had all knowledge as its purview, is now usually seen as distinct from the sciences and other disciplines. But the main concern of reasoning about the central issues of philosophy remains.

In the characterization above, a precise definition of philosophy has not been given. “What is philosophy?” is itself a question that philosophers discuss. A study of philosophy and its history shows the answer to be complex, subtle, and evolving. We return to the question in later sections, from Holism to What is philosophy, revisited?

Ways to answer the question

The difficulty

One aspect of philosophy is that it is on the edge of knowledge and endeavor and so its focus is always changing.

But its character also changes because the nature of the enterprise is not clear and so philosophy asks, “What is philosophy?”

Further since the system of knowledge and endeavor is complex, so to is the corresponding system of sub-disciplines within philosophy.

When topics within philosophy become established, i.e., no longer on the edge, they often become distinct disciplines. Examples are the natural sciences (it is not implied that these are closed disciplines). However, it does not follow that the sciences are ‘not philosophy’ even though they are not practiced within philosophy. Certainly, in times of scientific revolution, the philosophical aspect of science becomes important.

There are different attitudes to what the ‘edge endeavor’ should do, e.g., (i) it should address the important issues of life or society or both (ii) it should be concerned with the universe at large (metaphysics) and questions of knowledge (epistemology) and these issues should be approached so as to have comprehensive views vs rigorous conclusions. Such differences are reflected in the philosophy of the east vs the west and, within western philosophy, in the schools of analytic vs continental philosophy vs pragmatism. Whereas modern western philosophy tends to eschew esotericism, this is not the case universally or around the world.

Academic philosophy often seems removed from everyday life, e.g., ‘the meaning of life’, but there are mutual implications, and, further, the meaning of life has recently become a topic of focus in western analytic philosophy.

Etymology

Etymology was considered in the introduction to the question, above.

Practice and history

The role of practice and history was noted in the difficulty, above. The following approaches to history can be taken.

The ideas—generally and particularly, with focus on what philosophy is and its historical emergence.

The philosophers.

The schools of philosophy.

The disciplines

These are considered in detail in what follows.

Philosophy itself as a topic of study

This, too, has been noted above. It is sometimes regarded as a topic within Metaphilosophy. It seems clear to me that metaphilosophy is a topic of philosophy, and I argue the point later. However, there some philosophers and metaphilosophers see metaphilosophy as a distinct discipline.

Approaches in philosophy

The approach in philosophy is a major part of philosophy. Its elements include language, concepts, perception, questioning; its methods emphasize understanding and reason, both in Kant’s sense, which include the logics, and imagination. However, some recent approaches include experimental and computational philosophy.

Branches of philosophy

This section is a partial explanation of the structure of the divisions within philosophy.

Core disciplines of philosophy and their characteristic concerns arising from the reality-oriented nature of philosophy are—

Metaphysics—what is real? A related concern is that of the sciences defined by the divisions of the real.

Epistemology—how is the real known?

Axiology—what is of value in our lives and the world? While axiology is intimately related to ethics, and aesthetics, here we think to include ethics and aesthetics under axiology.

Logic—how do we reason in general and particularly about the questions of philosophy.

In early philosophy, the sciences and philosophy were not seen as essentially distinct. In the modern era, specialization and special methods led to seeing the sciences as distinct from philosophy. Some philosophers see philosophy as having its own subject matter and approaches. Philosophy became reflexive (self-reflecting) and the question “What is philosophy?” became an explicit concern. Further interests and characteristic concerns arose—

History of philosophy—not because it is or is not philosophy, but because it helps clarify what philosophy is.

Philosophies of the disciplines—what are their contents and how are their methods reliable?

Holism—what are the relations among the disciplines, are they truly separate?

Metaphilosophy—what is philosophy and what, if any, are its methods? As a distinct discipline, metaphilosophy is recent. There is debate whether it is philosophy—i.e., are its questions prior to questions of philosophy, or is it an inherent part of philosophy?

Philosophy and science—are they truly distinct and what is their relationship?

Non-western philosophy—some western philosophers felt it would contribute to philosophy; others felt that it is not philosophy proper at all.

Philosophers have often based their thought posits, which may have once been regarded as obvious (which was labeled ‘the infallibility of introspection’), about how we think, e.g., intuitively. However, such posits came to be questioned, and one recent approach to the issue is—

Experimental philosophy—a typical question is how or what do people think? Experimental philosophy engages in systematic questioning—surveys—to answer the question. Some philosophers question whether experimental philosophy is philosophy at all. However, it is potentially useful to philosophy.

Despite these distinctions, as noted earlier, the main concern of reasoning about the central issues of philosophy remains. An area in which philosophy can contribute to human lives is—

The meaning of life—what does it mean for life to have meaning or significance? And what is it that gives life meaning?

Having reviewed the field, the original question can itself be seen as philosophical—

What is philosophy, revisited? Though it is perhaps part of metaphilosophy, the question can now be answered with greater insight.

Metaphysics

What is metaphysics?

At its core, the study of metaphysics is the study of the real and its nature of reality, of what there is in the world, what its nature is, and what are its forms, relations, and processes.

Problems of metaphysics

Kinds of metaphysics—descriptive, speculative, analytic, synthetic-experiential.

What is the real? What is real?

How do we know the real—perfectly, pragmatically, joint. This is also a question for epistemology (this document): see, is knowledge precise (this document)? Knowledge and value. What is truth?

Pre-modern problems—the nature of being—being as such, first causes, unchanging things; categories of being and universals; problem of substance.

Early modern—materialism and empiricism, idealism, Immanuel Kant.

Modern and current—modality; identity (persistence and constitution), objects (referents), persons, space, time, and being; causation, determinism, and freedom; the mental and the physical—consciousness, mind, and matter.

What is causation? Is the world deterministic? Is the universe created? Can there be a creator of the universe?

What is an object or a person? What makes them the same even while they change?

Is the world composed of matter? Does matter exclude the mental?

What is mind? How is it related to bodies? Do we have minds—or is mind a metaphor for behavior?

Do we have free will?

Some metaphysical questions—a sample

What is real?

Do we know perfectly know the real?

What is truth?

What is causation? Is the world deterministic?

Is there a creator of the universe?

What is an object or a person? What makes them the same even while they change?

Is the world composed of matter? Does matter exclude the mental?

What is mind? How is it related to bodies? Do we have minds—or is mind a metaphor for behavior?

Do we have free will?

At its core, the study of metaphysics is the study of the real and its nature of reality, of what there is in the world, what its nature is, and what are its forms, relations, and processes. Here is a sample of metaphysical questions—

Epistemology

What is epistemology?

Epistemology is the study of knowledge. The core and motivating concern of epistemology is what we can know and how we can know it.

Central concepts—knowledge, belief, truth, justification

What is knowledge? Do we know anything at all?

Is knowledge precise? It is clear that not all knowledge is precise. But it is found that some knowledge is precise via abstraction, which is the removal of detail from a concept—precision or accuracy is attained by leaving only detail which is not distorted. That this can be done, and systematic metaphysics developed is a joint program for epistemology and metaphysics. The outcome is a unified metaphysics with epistemology that is dual by traditional criteria but unified by a value criterion.

Does the potential unreliability of knowledge have implications for how knowledge should be conceived?

Are our views of the way the world is—i.e., metaphysics—mere interpretations of our experience? How can we reconcile different interpretations that seem logically or physically indistinguishable? Can we go beyond interpretation to the real and, if so, then how?

How is knowledge acquired—understanding and reason? How is it assessed as reliable?

How is knowledge founded—justified, if at all? The problem of regress. Resolutions—foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism and relativism, unification of foundationalism and coherentism.

Skepticism and its role. Pyrrhonic and Cartesian skepticism.

Schools—empiricism, rationalism, skepticism, pragmatism, naturalized epistemology, epistemic relativism, epistemic constructionism, epistemic idealism, Bayesian epistemology.

Domains of inquiry—social epistemology, formal epistemology, Metaepistemology.

Some questions of epistemology

What is knowledge?

Do we know anything at all?

Is knowledge precise? It is clear that not all knowledge is precise. But it is found that some knowledge is precise via abstraction, which is the removal of detail from a concept—precision or accuracy is attained by leaving only detail which is not distorted. That this can be done, and systematic metaphysics developed is a joint program for epistemology and metaphysics.

How do we know what we know?

How is knowledge justified, if at all?

Are our views of the way the word is—i.e., metaphysics—mere interpretations of our experience? How can we reconcile different interpretations that seem logically or physically indistinguishable? Can we go beyond interpretation to the real and, if so, then how?

Do the questions following “What is knowledge?”, above, have implications for how knowledge should be conceived?

Axiology

What is axiology?

Axiology is the study of value, particularly ethical and aesthetic.

How are the different parts of axiology bound together?

Is the pursuit of beauty good?

Does the pursuit of beauty require justification?

When do economic and ethical ‘imperatives’ outweigh the aesthetic?

What is ethics?

Recognized branches of ethics follow. We begin with meta-ethics as it asks what ethics is.

In ethics there are meta-questions (What is ethics?), broad questions (What is the good, which is concerned with states or ends; what is right, which is about actions?), and particular questions (What is it best to do?)

Metaethics

Metaethics is about ethics—it asks what ethics is, what is it that is judged ethically (e.g., actions, ends, virtues, combinations of these), is ethical knowledge possible and how.

Normative ethics

The ethics of right and wrong, good and bad.

Deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics and more.

Applied ethics

The nature of applied ethics, the separability of ethics and contexts, ethical decisions, major fields of application.

Some questions of ethics

What is good? What makes actions, ends, or people good?

What is right? What makes actions right?

Is morality objective?

How should we treat others?

What is aesthetics

Meta-aesthetics

Asks what aesthetics is (the study of beauty and taste), what objects can be beautiful (natural, created), whether aesthetic judgments are objective, whether and in what way beauty is a value.

Aesthetic judgment

What characterizes a beautiful object… is it just taste, or is beauty objective, or is it objective as a relation between perceiver and perceived; to what extent is beauty universal; is the aesthetic ethical.

Philosophy of art

A distinction has been made… aesthetics is the study of beauty and taste, and philosophy of art is the study of works of art. Questions of philosophy of art concern what art it, what the aesthetic and other experience of creation and experiencing art is, whether and to what degree, aesthetic judgment of art is objective and universal.

Aesthetics and ethics

Is the pursuit of beauty good?

Does the pursuit of beauty require justification?

When do economic and ethical ‘imperatives’ outweigh the aesthetic?

Some questions of aesthetics

What is beauty? What is art?

What makes a piece of art beautiful?

How does beauty impact life?

And at the intersection of aesthetics and ethics—

Is the pursuit of beauty good?

Does the pursuit of beauty require justification?

When do economic and ethical ‘imperatives’ outweigh the aesthetic?

Logic

What is logic?

Philosophy is not just about questions and answers; but also, essentially, about reasons for the answers. This involves the study of reason and the structure of valid arguments and logic.

Philosophers treat logic as more inclusive than do mathematicians and scientists. Deductive logic is the central concern of mathematicians (as a tool and as a branch of mathematics and of logic, i.e., mathematical logic); a central concern in science is how we arrive at theories; these are both of concern in philosophy. But a philosopher is also concerned with the general nature of inference, what kinds of inference there are, and the relationship between the formal logics and reasoning in mathematics and science to informal reasoning.

When we think of logic as inference, so far as logic is concerned, it does not cover establishment of the premises, except as conclusions from further premises; since that would lead to regress, there is also concern with direct establishment of fact. The relatively recent term argument covers both inference (logic) and direct establishment of premises. In this sense there is overlap with epistemology.

How are facts directly and reliably established? While not traditionally part of logic, there is intersection with inference, and therefore establishing facts is worth considering at the same time as logic. As seen above, argument includes concern with reliability of facts.

Corroboration establishes repeatability (of some degree), but not reliability. Truth is the (idea of) capture of the essence, e.g., state of a thing by a concept or idea. Since distortion is possible, perhaps all facts may be questioned on that ground. The problem of reliability is (i) in what sense ideas capture the object (ii) and how reliability may be established. Abstraction establishes some facts, e.g., there is a universe (as all being). Is all establishment of fact empirical? Can some facts be established rationally, e.g., by exhausting alternatives? An example is existence of the void and the significant consequences of that existence. Pragmatism may avoid that idea by seeing reliability as functionality—a fact is pragmatically established if it is good enough for some purpose.

How are facts inferred from other facts?

Non-universalized patterns from facts (data). The pattern requires imagination (creation of the pattern idea or trying known patterns) and then checking the pattern against the data, which may be simple or require significant computation.

Universalizing patterns—i.e., ‘projection’ of a pattern from data to beyond the data. This too requires imagination. This is how theories of science and deductive logic are arrived at. The results are necessary over the input data but speculative over the universe.

Facts from facts. If we regard a universalization as a fact, the conclusion has some degree of likelihood or acceptability, but not necessity. However, in the realm that a scientific theory and a system of deduction are given, then the inference itself may be certain if the inference is deductive, but otherwise may be less than certain if the ‘reasoning’ is intuitive or heuristic.

How are these systems of inference reliable? Certain?

The foregoing also considers the following questions. What constitutes valid (vs invalid) reasoning? What kinds of reasoning are there, e.g., deductive and inductive? In deductive reasoning is the conclusion always at least implicit in the premise? What constitutes good reasoning in settings too unstructured to allow formal reasoning to fully apply? How can we relate formal and informal reasoning?

Meta-logical issues

How are logics established? Are they tentative? To what degree?

How are scientific theories established? Are they tentative?

Is the distinction between logic, mathematics, and science one of essence?

What is the dividing line between deductive logic and mathematics?

Can logic, mathematics, and science be brought under one umbrella as, e.g., the theory of the universe. Are there ways to characterize logic beside “good argument”? Indeed, there are, for logic and metaphysics are closely interwoven, e.g., in that logic may be seen as a theory of possible worlds—see, e.g., Possible Worlds (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

How are informal and formal logic related? How does the former motivate the latter? To what extent does the latter satisfy the needs of the former.

Some questions about logic

What constitutes valid vs invalid reasoning?

What kinds of formal reasoning are there, e.g., deductive, and inductive?

What constitutes good reasoning in settings too unstructured to allow formal reasoning to fully apply?

What is the relationship between formal and informal reasoning?

History of philosophy

In studying the field of philosophy, it is useful to understand how past philosophers have approached such questions. Because philosophy asks fundamental questions, it is always at the edge of knowledge and is therefore a cumulative enterprise—more so than science is. Consequently, the answers of the past can be inspiring and the way the questions have been answered, the arguments, can suggest new thought and novel approaches. What is more, awareness of past though helps avoid reinventing old arguments and avoid making old mistakes—because what often motivates study is not just the answers but whether the arguments are good and the answers true.

Approached this way, history of philosophy is philosophy—it is a cumulative record of the important questions and answers.

Philosophers in chronological order

The history of philosophy can be approached by reading the ideas of historical figures (see main influences for the way (the way of being) for details on the philosophers); the following is a select list of philosophers, almost all western (two stars indicate special influence on the way of being)—

Thales of Miletus**, Heraclitus*, Parmenides*, Socrates*, Democritus*, Plato**, Aristotle*, Epicurus*, Augustine*, Samkara, Adi**, Johannes Scotus Eriugena**, Thomas Aquinas*, William of Ockham*, Descartes, Rene**, Baruch Spinoza*, John Locke*, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm**, Berkeley, George, Hume, David**, Kant, Immanuel**, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich*, Schopenhauer, Arthur**, Mill, John Stuart*, Karl Marx*, Nietzsche, Friedrich**, Hans Vaihinger**, Husserl, Edmund, Alexander, Samuel **, Whitehead, Alfred North**, Russell, Bertrand, Arthur, William**, Wittgenstein, Ludwig**, Heidegger, Martin**, Popper, Karl Raimund**, Quine, Willard Van Orman**, Searle, John**, Nagel, Thomas*, Kripke, Saul Aaron*, Lewis, David**, Lowe, E. J.*, Chalmers, David*

Western schools and ideologies

Some organizing principles

The history of philosophy can also be studied in terms of ‘schools of philosophy’ which are organized around key ideas or approaches—

Metaphysics can be materialist or idealist; it can be monist (there is one kind of thing) or dualist (more than one kind—e.g., mind and matter)—or it may eschew ‘kinds’ altogether.

Epistemology can be empirical (knowledge originates from sense data), rational (reason reveals knowledge), or pragmatic (knowledge is marked by usefulness). Of course, there could be combinations. Or perhaps there is an original approach, meaning one that does not presume received ideas, that finds its way to truth without an ‘ism’. The philosophers are sometimes classed as empiricist-materialist vs rationalist-idealist. It is not a perfect categorization—surely any ultimate philosophy would transcend positing categories and be original in the above meaning.

Ethics is consequential (the good is determined by ‘ends’), deontological (it is actions that are right or wrong) or determined by virtue (it emphasizes virtue or moral character). Actual ethics can be situational in being a combination. But what combination? And is ethics situational in another sense—e.g., is there a right thing for a discrete situation or does the place of the situation in the whole matter? These are subject matters for meta-ethics.

History of philosophy has a plethora of schools and isms, which makes some people doubt the value and validity of philosophy. However, the different approaches are suggestive, and their existence does not rule out original thought in the sense of ‘original’ used above.

Metaphysics of substance

Materialism

Idealism

Monism and neutral monism

Dualism

Pluralism

Pluralism (philosophy) - Wikipedia

Zeroism

One could use the term ‘Zeroism’ to refer to the idea that no foundation (not substance, not bundle theory, not process philosophy—and not even coherence among ideas) is necessary to understand—fully know—the world other than, perhaps, the world itself’; could consider ‘Zeroism’, but that is not illuminating and the term sometimes refers to the (Buddhist) belief that the physical world is an illusion; also, could use ‘Theory of Being’ but, again, that is not illuminating. The topic is discussed under Metaphysical existentialism (this document), below

Metaphysics—bundle theory

Metaphysics—process philosophy

Metaphysics—trope theory

Metaphysical existentialism

The metaphysical thesis that there are no fundamental entities or kinds other than the world and its contents, joined to the epistemological position that, fundamentally, none is necessary; put another way, to be understood, the world needs no foundation other than itself; put another way, the essential ‘substance’ is being or, put epistemically, the essential ‘substance’ is knowledge-of-being

against classical substance as a kind of being that has independent existence and constitutes all that there is; that is—existence itself is fundamental, not one or more of its (hypothetical) kinds;

Related but identical to Heidegger’s metaphysics; not, as far as I know, a named ‘ism’

See Zeroism (this document), above

Metaphysical existentialism as in the linked pages in this section, lean toward a relational metaphysics

Relational metaphysics

Epistemology

Empiricism

Rationalism

Pragmatism

Epistemic existentialism

Modification of metaphysical existentialism, not being or existence but knowledge of being is fundamental; not a named ‘ism’; perfection possible for some objects by abstraction; the ideal or perfect can be joined to the pragmatic to yield a non-substance metaphysics that has perfection in terms of a dual epistemology (perfect for the ideal, good enough for the pragmatic), which is justified in terms of a value revealed by the ideal

Ethics

See Ethics (this document), above

Consequentialism

Deontological ethics

Virtue ethics

Ancient

Atomism

Skepticism

Emanation (ism)

Medieval

Patrism

Scholasticism

Enlightenment and after

Rationalism

See above, under Epistemology (this document)

Positivism

Idealism

British Idealism

Empiricism

Modern

Analytic philosophy

Continental philosophy

Existentialism

Emergentism

Holism

Intuitionism

Language philosophy

Logical positivism

See analytic philosophy (this document), earlier

Logical empiricism

See analytic philosophy (this document), earlier

Materialism

See above, under Metaphysics (this document)

Physicalism

See above, under Metaphysics (this document)

Pragmatism

See above, under Epistemology (this document)

Process philosophy

See above, under Metaphysics (this document)

Realism

Indian philosophy—periods and schools

Original

Veda

Upanishad

Bhagavad Gita

Āstika

The Āstika or Orthodox schools accept the authority of the Vedas.

Nyaya

Vaishesika

Samkhya

Yoga

Purva Mimansa

Vedanta

Advaita or non-dual

Samkara

Ramanuja—qualified non-dualism

Dvaita or dual

Nāstika

The Nāstika or Heterodox schools do not accept the authority of the Vedas. There are four main schools—

Cārvāka

Ājīvika

Buddhism

Jainism

Ideas

It is perhaps of greater value than the above approaches to study history of philosophy as history of ideas in philosophy. The following ideas from the metaphysics of the way of being (detailed version) are in no sense a complete list of important ideas in philosophy (in later updates, justice to completeness will be attempted). However, the system of ideas is not idiosyncratic—they are the main ideas of the metaphysics of the way, a metaphysics that is ultimate with regard to foundation for the world and though incomplete with regard to the variety of the world, it is shown that knowledge of variety must always be limited for limited beings—

Essential ideas from the way of being

the ultimate, being, abstraction, meaning, reason(s), universe, creation, law (cosmos), the void, metaphysics, cosmology, experience, the way

Detailed list from the way of being

being, abstraction, substance, against substance, experience, concept, beings (existents), meaning, language, grammar, lexicon, knowledge, reasons, indeterminism, universe, creation, void, law, possibility, necessity, unconditionality, contingency, logic, plenitude, transience, emergence, cosmos, difference, sameness, formation, form, identity, extension, duration, individual, death, peak being, nature, society, the universal, reason, understanding, doubt, interpretation, indistinguishability, logic, heuristics (imagination), general logic, intelligence, enjoyment, reason-with-action

Philosophies of the disciplines

The questions that arise in philosophy in general, also arise in relation to the knowledge or academic disciplines. Thus, regarding science, there are questions of what it is, whether scientific theories truth—final or temporary, or pragmatically justified. Questions about art can also be asked about literature. Here is a sample of the philosophies of the disciplines—

Our world—philosophy of the humanities

Philosophy of philosophy

See Metaphilosophy (this document), later

Philosophy of knowledge

See Epistemology (this document), earlier

Philosophy and metaphysics of questions

Philosophy of reason

Philosophy of tradition

Philosophy of feminism

Philosophy of religion

The real and given universe

General science, abstract sciences, and method

Philosophy of metaphysics

See Metaphilosophy (this document), later

See Philosophy of linguistics… (this document), Logic (this document), Philosophy of logic (this document)

Philosophy of mind

Philosophy of linguistics, sign systems, study of language

For philosophy of language and linguistic meaning, see Language, meaning, and philosophy* (this document), later

Philosophy of logic

Philosophy of mathematics

Philosophy of computer science

Meta-disciplinary study

A metatheory is one that asks questions about a theory or branch of knowledge (as its etymology is accidental, ‘metaphysics’ is an exception—but of course, questions about physics and metaphysics may arise in metaphysics); it may be considered part of that branch; aim is to improve the quality of questions and answers, to formalize understanding of the branch, and, formally and informally, contribute to the branch (especially as in metamathematics)

See Metaphilosophy (this document), later, Ethics (this document), earlier, for metaethics

Method

Metaphysics and the a priori

General logic

bare content (the way of being) and very bare content (the way of being) discuss a notion of ‘general logic’ under which fall both direct and indirect or inferential establishment of knowledge; degrees of certainty are admitted; therefore general logic includes logic and the logics, mathematics, and the sciences

Concrete sciences

Philosophy of science

Physical sciences

Biology

Anthropology

Psychology

Society, social science, and sciences

Social science

Anthropology

Law

Politics

Economics

War

Applied science

Philosophy of Technology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Applied sciences I—physical sciences

Applied sciences II—biology and psychology

Applied sciences III—social science

Applied sciences IV—science for advanced civilization and being

Applied sciences V—application of the abstract sciences

History

Artifact and the created world

Art

The arts

Technology

Being and the universe

Transformation of being

Theory of transformation of being

Intrinsic modes of transformation

Instrumental modes of transformation

Dual modes

Being the universe

Peak phase

Dispositional phase

Holism

Philosophy

Are the areas or branches of philosophy—metaphysics etc—independent of one another?

They are not entirely independent. For example, the idea of logic as argument is important, in part, as a means of answering philosophical and other questions.

Also, as knowledge may be seen as a form (conceptual) that corresponds to other forms (in the world), metaphysics is important to epistemology in two ways—(i) it informs epistemology about the forms (ii) because knowledge is in the world, metaphysics can be seen as encompassing epistemology. On the other hand, epistemology is critical to metaphysics and axiology. Thus, in modern philosophy, epistemology has been seen as prior to metaphysics. A neutral and reasonable attitude is that neither is prior in all ways, metaphysics contains epistemology (knowledge is an essential part of the world), and epistemology empowers metaphysics. It will be further seen that the question of priority is not entirely one of metaphysics and epistemology as distinct, but also one of values, especially ethics.

Now consider the question of whether we can know anything at all. The school of ‘Pyrrhonic Skepticism’ denied that we know anything. Their position was not entirely negative, for it was argued that, since we know nothing, things other than knowledge were most important in life. But what are we to make of the idea that we know nothing? We can view skepticism as negative or positive—as seeking to construct by doubting, by being critical. Since we seem to know something and since that ‘knowledge’ enables function, the thought that we know nothing at all suggests that any conception—or lack of conception—of knowledge according to which ‘we know nothing’ ought reviewed for improvement. But how? If we think of knowledge as concepts, iconic-linguistic, that correspond to objects, then, since the concept is not the object, perhaps we do not know anything. There are many attempts to found all knowledge in concept-object terms, but these are bound to be problematic. An alternative is to ask whether to be considered knowledge, usefulness could be considered as an alternative and an adequate criterion. Thus, there is a pragmatic theory of knowledge (and meaning) and its basis, since utility is a value, is inherently ethical. Therefore, epistemology and ethics interact.

But surely, the interactions among the areas of philosophy are not so tight that no independent study is possible? The most neutral position that we can take is that there is interaction, that to account to the interactions is essential, but that independent study is also possible, at least to some degree.

On systematic philosophy

The aim of system in philosophy is to see the world as an interactive whole. But system has been criticized as being speculative, dogmatically imposed, too ambitious (‘grand narrative’), unrealistic because impossible, and not attentive to local but more important problems. The criticism itself has been criticized as being too sweeping—itself grand, itself an attempt to impose a point of view such as piece meal analysis.

The conflict may be resolved by the following neutral and committed approach (i) by allowing system to emerge with reason rather than imposing it (ii) attention to local narratives parallel to and in interaction with system as appropriate.

Emergence of system

System may emerge (i) by considering the branches and problems of philosophy in interaction (ii) by incremental, rational, and empirical fitting of a system of concepts to the emergent picture, not just of philosophy, but of the world and its disciplines (as in the way of being > an essay on the way of being).

It will be found that there is a circle or system of problems of philosophy that require mutual adjustment to have full meaning and that no single or limited set of those problems can be best resolved in isolation. However, problems are often approached in isolation—it is not that the other issues are ignored; rather, their status as received is regarded as given. For example, to discuss ‘being’ requires discussion not only of the object of ‘being’ but also of the concept; this brings into question the meaning of being; which, since the received analysis of both being and meaning are incomplete, requires analysis of meaning. However, often, in such discussions, the meaning of ‘meaning’ is taken as received.

For another example, consider the question of the completeness of science. In the late nineteenth century, physics was often seen as essentially complete. However, the emergence of relativity and quantum theory, showed nineteenth century to be essentially incomplete.

Today, many scientists and others regard physics as essentially complete in that all the areas of discovery are known, in that current physics is agrees well with the experimental data. It is, however, consistent with science as empirical that there are realms beyond the known, which are entirely different from the known but that since we conflate the real with the known, we do not recognize the possibility of realms beyond.

It is possible, of course, that physics is essentially complete in the sense just above; however, to claim that it is complete is without basis. Since there may be realms beyond the known, the question of the completeness of science, a question in the philosophy of science, cannot be resolved without a full metaphysics. Yet, modern philosophy of science, though it recognizes the openness of science, does not generally recognize the significance of metaphysics—in fact any metaphysics beyond what is revealed in science is generally denied. In the way of being, metaphysics as study of the real is possible, and the metaphysics of the way shows that the realms beyond the empirically known are without limit.

Within metaphysics it is found that the problems of identity, of the nature of experience (e.g., consciousness), the nature of the world as revealed in experience—given that there are multiple consistent interpretations of experience, the nature being, of knowledge and meaning, and more, require mutual treatment for their best resolution.

A note on purism*

Earlier, it was noted that that abstraction leads to (some) knowledge in which concepts correspond perfectly to the objects.

It was noted just above that in a pragmatic approach, utility is the measure; and it is one that does not require perfection (the pragmaticism of Charles Sanders Pierce was rather different—he regarded pragmatism vulgar—in his pragmaticism, the conception of an object, is the sum of the conceptions of its effects; that is, he seemed to be defining objects by their relations or interactions).

Now combine the thoughts in the two previous paragraphs.

In the metaphysics of the way of being, there is an abstract and perfect side that reveals the universe as ultimate and a value according to which, pragmatic knowledge, though ‘imperfect’ is the only and therefore best instrument, to negotiate the ideal. Therefore, the dual knowledge system, with dual epistemology, is, indeed, a perfect and seamless (non-dual) system of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics (of course, it is not implied that local ethics and local knowledge are unimportant or that they are in any sense perfect in their setting).

While we have and continue to search for purism in philosophy, we have just found that purism of knowledge, ethics, and their criteria are neither possible nor desirable.

A note on holism*

An aspect of atomism is that a system is ‘made’ of parts or atoms—i.e., the properties of a whole is determined by the properties of the parts.

Holism denies atomism. That is, naïvely, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Or, perhaps less naïvely, the properties of the parts are a function of the whole and not just of the parts themselves.

Two kinds of holism are commonly recognized (i) epistemic holism—the thesis that scientific theories cannot be tested in isolation because the world is not compartmentalized and, therefore, tests of just some theories depend on others (ii) meaning or semantic holism—the thesis that the meaning of a term or sentence can only be understood in terms of their context, which may be the entire linguistic system. Since language is engaged in knowledge, the two kinds of holism are linked.

Epistemic holism is widely accepted but with restriction—nature does allow of some compartmentalization, which enables the development of science; but this compartmentalization is, at least in principle until otherwise shown, only approximate, which is one reason we expect the revision of scientific theories.

In the discussion of Holism in philosophy, above, epistemic holism is extended to philosophy.

Meaning holism is not as widely accepted as epistemic holism. An objection to meaning holism is that words and sentences do seem to have definite meaning.

However, the very notion of meaning is seen as questionable by some philosophers—first in regard to what it is, and secondly in that the independence of meaning presumes a context, outside which independence breaks down. In going beyond a social context, e.g., in the historical process of societies, reconstruction of meaning is necessary, and this reconstruction requires mutual consideration of all elements of a language. In the case of science and philosophy, the historical process is one of the growths of the system of knowledge or understanding to incorporate more of the world, which requires the mutual adjustment of received meaning as well as infusion of new meanings. In fact, we can see the presumed independence of language from knowledge in informal use to be an approximation.

How can we simultaneously accommodate the apparent degree of both atomism and holism in language? Moderate holism is the thesis that meanings depend on some subset of the language; that there is a fixed subset or that the subset depends on the context are both problematic. Instead, we might consider that in meaning, our current best knowledge is that in general atomism vs holism depends on context and process.

Language, meaning, and philosophy*

In language, atomism is the idea that the meaning of sentences is determined by grammar, from the meanings of the individual words.

However, the meaning of a word is problematic (i) use is not constant which may be explained by saying that the sign of the word in fact designates many words or that use is determined by context (ii) in questioning whether words have meanings at all.

How can words not have meanings at all? Consider, first the sign that designates the word. Say the word is tiger and the sign is ‘tiger’. An English speaker would naturally associate ‘tiger’ with a large cat that has black and orange stripes. But a non-English, Hindi speaker would not make the association. Similarly, since बाघ is the Hindi word for tiger, a Hindi speaker would associate ‘बाघ’ with tigers, but an English speaker would not.

The mental image of a tiger is an iconic concept, the word-image combination is a linguistic concept; and the iconic concept is also a linguistic concept in which the linguistic component is empty. Let us use the word ‘concept’ for ‘linguistic concept’ and conflate ‘word’ and ‘concept’. Then sentences gain their meaning from their word arrangement and grammar (with context in the background). So, ‘concept’ may subsume ‘sentence’ and greater linguistic forms. While the meaning of a linguistic atom (e.g., word) derives from the icon, the meaning of a compound derives also from arrangement of the atoms and grammar.

Then, meaning is a concept and its possible objects; and knowledge is meaning realized.

Is precise meaning and knowledge possible at all? In everyday use, meaning and knowledge is often good enough for purposes at hand. In science, the precision is often amazing and adequate to demanding needs. But in neither of those cases can we say that the concept is perfectly faithful to the object. Yet, in ‘Is knowledge precise’ it has been seen that there is some potent perfect knowledge.

In doing philosophy, meanings have interdependence, and must change (grow), as philosophy incorporates more of the world. We have just seen the meaning of ‘meaning’ grow.

Metaphilosophy

Is there a philosophy of philosophy? There is a discipline which serves as such—it called metaphilosophy and asks questions such as What is philosophy? What is philosophy for? How should philosophy be done?

But whereas “What is science?” is not a question of science, “What is philosophy?” is or at least seems very much like a philosophical question.

Thus, metaphilosophy seems as though it would count as—a branch of—philosophy, yet it is debated whether it is prior to philosophy or inherently part of philosophy.

Inclusion of metaphilosophy is justified (i) by the argument that it is part of philosophy is reasonable (ii) in that metaphilosophy is useful to philosophy.

Experimental philosophy

In philosophy, rational analysis of meaning and concepts has been paramount. This does not mean that philosophy does not refer to the world but that it is frequently taken for granted that reference to the world is inherent in some elements such as sense data or ideas.

That is, certain intuitions are accepted as basic. But are the claimed intuitions in fact common intuition? Is there an intuition that all knowledge is of one kind? That we have free will and whether belief in free will affects moral responsibility?

Is experimental philosophy in fact philosophy? Does it impact development of philosophy?

These are open questions (the attitude of openness is one of simultaneous neutrality at a low level but commitment at a higher level). We include experimental philosophy because of its potential usefulness and as an example of evolution of ideas of what philosophy is.

Non-western philosophy

Some western philosophers have thought that true philosophy is found only in the west. Perhaps this is because non-western philosophy is seen as non-critical and non-reflexive. However, while that is true of some non-western thought, philosophical questions have been contemplated in the east, in critical, imaginative, and reflexive light.

Today there is interest in—

African philosophy, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Japanese philosophy, and more.

The non-western philosophies can be studied for their established or emerging thought.

It is worth considering whether there can be fruitful integration of world philosophies.

Philosophy and science

In the early development of western thought, philosophy and science were intertwined. That this should have been so is natural enough, given that rational and empirical thought should both be a reaction to and turn away from superstition and dogma.

The modern separation is the result of (i) development of distinct and detailed subject matter for the sciences, and the need for specialized institutions (departments) and means of study (ii) consequently a restricted view of philosophy and a search by philosophers for distinctly philosophical areas and means of study—and contemplation of the question whether philosophy was about the world.

Thus, while many philosophers today are concerned to do philosophy as practiced, especially in universities, others have been concerned, also, to address the question of what philosophy is. Wittgenstein and Quine had opposing views; Wittgenstein held philosophy to not be science, while Quine thought philosophy and science to be one (and both, as would seem natural, had definite views on what philosophy was not).

But knowledge, while it is not entirely seamless, seems, as we saw above, to ‘pour’ from one area into another—horizontally, because, e.g., physics and biology are not perfectly distinct, and vertically because, e.g., questions on the nature of science and the content of science interact.

A takeaway from this section is that though there are many matters that are distinctly philosophical, philosophy and the other disciplines have mutual implication, and philosophy is also about the world (and necessarily so where thought is on the border of the known and the unknown, the specialized and the general).

The meaning of life

About the meaning of life

In this section the meaning of ‘meaning’ has difference from its meaning in ‘linguistic meaning’.

There is continuing interest among philosophers and ‘lay’ persons about what is important, about the broad questions with which we began.

And while philosophy does has not answered all such questions—and cannot since the issues are so varied and untidy—it can have an impact on them.

For example, continental philosophy addresses the ‘nature of the human condition’, and analytic metaphysics may address the question of the nature of the universe beyond science.

Finally, the meaning of life is a recently recognized field in ‘Anglo-American-Australasian philosophy’—see the meaning of life.

The ‘meaning of life’ speaks to finding and living our significance in the context of the broadest and deepest questions.

In the neutral vein we may assert that while philosophy does not give us the meaning or even a meaning of life, it gives us an approach to meaning and in living philosophically, a way of meaning.

Philosophy in action

The following are personal reflections.

The idea of philosophy in action is (i) received thought, understanding, and reason as they currently stand (ii) but to allow some compromise of ‘rigor’ in the interest of action (iii) perhaps for thought and action to weave together rather than have one time application (iv) the net aim is to get good outcomes (perhaps even optimal ones).

Thus, philosophy in action is quite different from philosophy of action.

Philosophy in action would intersect philosophy of life and of the meaning of life.

Use would be in relatively narrow and broad concerns; the broadest is perhaps the real metaphysics (which is already intended to be in action).

What is philosophy, revisited?

Regardless of the resolution of the debate whether metaphilosophy is just part of philosophy, the discussion of metaphilosophy brings us back reflexively, to the opening question, What is philosophy?

Two opposing trends in philosophy are (i) narrowing and specializing (ii) broadening and encompassing. Given that the world does not recognize the distinctions of our academic disciplines, surely there should be an ‘over-discipline’. But which of the academic disciplines would that over-discipline be? The issue is partly political, for the practitioners of the disciplines resent intrusion from thinkers outside the disciplines. At the same time, there are real distinctions of subject matter and method. And we may doubt that there can be a single systematic metaphysics of everything.

Still, we can ask whether there can and ought to be a single, perhaps at most partially systematic, world-discipline. And since knowledge and ethics are in the world, that discipline would study not just the external world but knowledge, the disciplines, value, truth, and method.

It would study itself—rather, its practitioners would study their discipline (and perhaps their disciplinary activity as well).

It would integrate academic philosophy with philosophy for life.

Though the disciplines have boundaries, they are not watertight. Is there a point to having an ‘over-discipline’ of which the various disciplines are a part? Should that discipline be named ‘philosophy’? It would recognize the diversity and unity of disciplines. It would allow but not require system; and such system would be emergent, not imposed. Of all recognized ‘disciplines’, philosophy comes closest to an over-discipline.

A candidate for such philosophy is the universal or real metaphysics.

In an attitude of both neutrality and commitment—

We might well call that over-discipline ‘philosophy’.

Appendix I—The problems of philosophy

General

The universe—metaphysics

What is metaphysics? Is it possible?

What is the universe like? What is its extent and duration? What are its limits?

What are the realms of being—e.g., nature, society, the experiential world, and the universal, i.e., beyond secularism.

Knowledge—epistemology

What is knowledge?

How are appearance and reality distinguished? Are they ultimately distinct?

How is knowledge arrived at? Justified? What are our conceptions of justification? Are justification and value related?

Axiology

What is value? What is of value?

Are the different kinds of value, e.g., ethical and aesthetic, related? What is the relation?

Ethics

The questions of value as they relate to morals, i.e., the good, the right, and the virtuous.

What are the various approaches to ethics and its schools?

Metaethics, e.g., what ethics is.

Aesthetics

The questions of value as they relate to beauty.

Appendix II—Sources

The document, toward a database for philosophy.html lists sources from the Internet, especially online encyclopedias of philosophy, and the way of being website.

Some sources for the problems of philosophy are Bertrand Russell’s Problems of Philosophy, and List of unsolved problems in philosophy - Wikipedia.